2016 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

2-22-2016

Derek Capozzi v. Pigos

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016

Recommended Citation
"Derek Capozzi v. Pigos" (2016). 2016 Decisions. 185.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016/185

This February is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2016 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 13-3976
___________
DEREK A. CAPOZZI,
Appellant
v.
PIGOS, MD; MARC HOLBROOK, MD; MICHAEL J. GROWSE, MD;
COLL, MD; VARIOUS OTHER (UNKNOWN) B.O.P. EMPLOYEES;
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-11-cv-01628)
District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
August 3, 2015
Before: FUENTES, SHWARTZ and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: February 22, 2016)
___________
OPINION*
___________
*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

PER CURIAM
Pro se appellant Derek Capozzi appeals the District Court’s orders granting
summary judgment to the defendants and denying his request for leave to supplement his
complaint. For the reasons detailed below, we will affirm in part, vacate in part, and
remand.
Capozzi, a federal inmate serving a lengthy sentence, filed a Bivens action against
numerous defendants in 2011. As pertinent here, Capozzi claimed that the defendants
provided him with inadequate medical treatment. Capozzi was initially injured in March
2008 when a fellow prisoner stabbed him several times in the neck and chest. Doctors
performed surgery, but Capozzi claimed that he continued to experience chest pain. In
June 2009, he underwent an echocardiogram, and was diagnosed with having a fistula
from his proximal ascending aorta to his right ventricle — which he refers to as a hole in
his heart. Since then, Capozzi has repeatedly requested surgical intervention, but his
doctors, while providing him with various types of treatment, have declined to order
surgery. Capozzi contends that the doctors’ failure to perform surgery constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
In July 2012, Capozzi sought to supplement his complaint to add a claim of
retaliation. He alleged that in June 2012, he was temporarily transferred to the Fayette
County (Kentucky) Detention Center to stand trial for charges relating to his April 2010
escape from prison. Fayette County is a state facility with very restrictive conditions and
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limited medical resources. Capozzi had sought to be placed in FMC-Lexington, the
facility where he had been held from April 2010 until July 2011, but was refused.
Capozzi alleged that officials from FMC-Lexington prevented him from being held there
in retaliation for his naming them as defendants in his initial Bivens complaint.
The District Court denied all relief to Capozzi. First, the Court denied Capozzi’s
request to supplement his complaint, holding that adding the retaliation claim would be
futile because Capozzi had not exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to that
claim. Subsequently, the Court, adopting in part a Magistrate Judge’s report and
recommendation, granted summary judgment to the defendants on Capozzi’s Eighth
Amendment claim. The Court held that, while Capozzi clearly disagreed with the
defendants’ medical decisions, he could not show that they had been deliberately
indifferent to his medical needs. Capozzi filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.1
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See generally Gen. Ceramics
Inc. v. Firemen’s Fund Ins. Cos., 66 F.3d 647, 651 (3d Cir. 1995). We exercise a plenary
standard of review as to the summary-judgment order, State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.
v. Pro Design, P.C., 566 F.3d 86, 89 (3d Cir. 2009), and review the order denying leave
to supplement for abuse of discretion, see Owens-Ill., Inc. v. Lake Shore Land Co., 610
F.2d 1185, 1189 (3d Cir. 1979).
1

In his initial complaint, Capozzi included a number of additional claims, but he
voluntarily dismissed those claims and has stated in his brief that they are not at issue in
this appeal.
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We agree with the District Court’s summary-judgment decision. To state a viable
Eighth Amendment claim, Capozzi was required to show that the defendants were
deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
104 (1976). “To act with deliberate indifference to serious medical needs is to recklessly
disregard a substantial risk of serious harm.” Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 330 (3d
Cir. 2009).
As the District Court held, Capozzi’s Eighth Amendment claim involves, at
bottom, a dispute with his doctors over whether surgery is currently appropriate. The
record reveals that, since Capozzi’s initial surgery, medical providers have continually
monitored Capozzi’s condition; Capozzi has had frequent appointments with doctors,
been prescribed medication to alleviate his symptoms, underwent numerous
echocardiograms, and worn a Holter monitor for a 24-hour period. In June 2009, Dr.
Mohammed Imam advised that surgery might be appropriate, but stated that Capozzi’s
case would have to be reviewed in further detail before any decisions were made. In
October 2009, Dr. Azhar Aslam reported that “the risks of surgical repair of his condition
would not be suitable considering his overall clinical stability.” Subsequently, various
medical providers have reiterated Dr. Aslam’s conclusion.
While Capozzi believes that his condition requires surgical intervention, we have
recognized that courts will “disavow any attempt to second-guess the propriety or
adequacy of a particular course of treatment[,] which remains a question of sound
4

professional judgment.” Inmates of Allegheny Cnty. Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d
Cir. 1979) (internal alterations, quotation marks omitted)). Therefore, the District Court
properly granted summary judgment on this claim to the defendants. See generally
Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004) (explaining that “mere disagreement as
to the proper medical treatment” is insufficient to state a constitutional violation
(alteration, quotation marks omitted)).2
However, we conclude that the District Court erred in concluding that it would be
futile for Capozzi to supplement his complaint to assert a retaliation claim. Under the
Prison Litigation Reform Act, a prisoner must exhaust all “available” administrative
remedies prior to bringing suit. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see generally Porter v. Nussle, 534
U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Here, the defendants acknowledge that administrative remedies
were not available to Capozzi during his incarceration in the Fayette County Detention
Center, which is where he was held at the time that he filed his motion to supplement.
The District Court concluded that remedies were nevertheless available under § 1997e(a)
because Capozzi was subsequently returned to federal custody, where his access to

2

Capozzi disputes the assertion, which is included in a few of the medical reports, that he
was able to exercise strenuously and do ten sets of 50 push-ups a day. That dispute,
however, is not material to our resolution of Capozzi’s Eighth Amendment claim. See
generally Am. Eagle Outfitters v. Lyle & Scott Ltd., 584 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2009).
Nor can Capozzi survive summary judgment by alleging, generally, that the defendants
have “lied” about his condition. See Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595, 608
(3d Cir. 2002) (“conclusory, self-serving affidavits are insufficient to withstand a motion
for summary judgment”).
5

administrative relief was restored (and where he could have requested permission to file
an untimely grievance, see 28 C.F.R. § 542.14(b)).
We are not persuaded that administrative remedies were available to Capozzi in
these circumstances. Under the defendants’ rationale, administrative remedies apparently
were not available to Capozzi at the time that he filed, remained unavailable when the
Magistrate Judge ruled on the motion to supplement, but then became available by the
time that the District Court reviewed Capozzi’s objections to the Magistrate Judge’s
order. This rule unnecessarily complicates the analysis to be performed by district courts.
It would likewise place a prisoner like Capozzi in a quandary: he would be forced to
choose between (a) waiting to vindicate what he believed to be a violation of his
constitutional rights until, sometime in the unknown future,3 he was transferred back to
federal custody, or (b) filing a complaint that could be subject to dismissal when transfer
did occur. See Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201, 209 (3d Cir. 2002) (stressing that
exhaustion must be completed before the suit is filed).
The plain language of the PLRA — which, in referring to administrative remedies
“as are available,” suggests that prisoners must exhaust those remedies that exist at the
time that they bring the action, cf. Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 313 (3d Cir.
2001) (en banc) (so construing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)) — does not require such uncertainty.

3

It appears that Capozzi was previously held in Kentucky pending trial for more than 14
months.
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Thus, in these unusual circumstances, we conclude that the District Court erred in
denying leave to supplement on the ground that administrative remedies were available to
Capozzi.4
Accordingly, we will affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand. Capozzi’s motion
for oral argument and appointment of counsel is denied.

4

We express no opinion as to whether the retaliation claim is meritorious or whether the
defendants might challenge the motion to supplement on other grounds.
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